allowing Verizon to have an independent POI from 2 | AT&T.

So, under AT&T's proposal, Verizon would 4∥not be required to interconnect to AT&T at the POI 5 AT&T selects for its own traffic, giving Verizon somewhat more freedom and possibly a more efficient arrangement.

Is that arrangement what's MR. EDWARDS: being addressed in 1.3?

MR. TALBOTT: All right.

11 MR. EDWARDS: Perhaps my confusion results from this. You originally filed testimony; 12

correct? In your name only.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. 14

> On issue 1.1. MR. EDWARDS:

And then after the rebuttal testimony was filed, you filed revised direct testimony and added 18 Mr. Schell and made some other corrections;

19∥ correct?

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MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

MR. EDWARDS: Then last night I got 21 corrections to your testimony, and I believe I'm

1 the establishment of that POI has to be by mutual 2 agreement; and absent mutual agreement, AT&T chooses where it is; is that right? Or it defaults to the AT&T switch? 5 MR. TALBOTT: It defaults to the AT&T 6∥switch. 7 All right. MR. EDWARDS: 8 post-competition scenario number one. AT&T switch is located in Roanoke, the parties have not been 10 able to agree on the location of the Verizon POI. It defaults under this language to the AT&T switch 12 in Roanoke; is that correct? That would be correct. MR. TALBOTT: 13 MR. EDWARDS: And in post-competition one 14 15 scenario, Staunton caller B is now an AT&T local 16 market customer. Are you with me? MR. TALBOTT: So we have Verizon 17 originating customer in Staunton, and AT&T customer 19 to which the call is going to terminate in Staunton? 201 21 MR. EDWARDS: That's correct.

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Okay.

MR. TALBOTT:

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MR. EDWARDS: All right. Now, caller A 2 wants to place the same call to caller B: 3 call will not stay within the local calling area in Staunton, but instead will travel to the AT&T switch, which is also the Verizon POI in Roanoke, and be terminated on the AT&T network; correct?

> MR. TALBOTT: That's correct.

MR. EDWARDS: And under AT&T's proposal, Verizon would be responsible for all the costs it incurs to carry that call from Staunton to Roanoke; correct?

> MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

MR. EDWARDS: And in terms of revenue, Verizon still receives basic local telephone revenue from caller A, but no longer receives that revenue from caller B; correct?

> MR. TALBOTT: That's correct.

MR. EDWARDS: When Verizon terminates that call or delivers that call to be terminated on the 20 AT&T network, Verizon also pays less recip comp charges; correct?

MR. TALBOTT: Must cover AT&T's costs for

1 calls terminating on Verizon's network.

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MR. EDWARDS: So, the difference between 3 scenario one and scenario two is that Verizon has 4 lost basic local revenue from customer B, and has 5 incurred the cost of transport to call from 6 Staunton to Roanoke and has incurred the costs of recip comp to AT&T?

8 MR. TALBOTT: The point that you left out was that--

10 Is that correct? And then MR. EDWARDS: 11 you can answer.

> MR. TALBOTT: No, it's not correct.

MR. EDWARDS: All right.

Because what you left out of MR. TALBOTT: 15 | that description is that prior to the advent of 16 competition, Verizon had costs to terminate to traffic. Verizon still has costs to terminate that It compensates AT&T reciprocal traffic. compensation for doing that on Verizon's behalf.

So, the difference between before and 21 after competition is the costs to deliver the 22 traffic to the AT&T point of interconnection.

1 MR. EDWARDS: But the other factor to 2 consider, Mr. Talbott, is that prior to 3 competition, Verizon had local revenue coming from 4 two sources, and after competition it has it only 5 coming from one.

That's irrelevant. MR. TALBOTT: competition in the marketplace.

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Now, you would agree with MR. EDWARDS: me, Mr. Talbott, depending on AT&T's penetration in the local market, Verizon's transport obligations could become significant?

MR. TALBOTT: I'm not certain how to characterize what significant could be. think I could answer that.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, in fact, there is, I 16 believe, under your proposal -- there is no threshold 17∥of traffic.

> MR. TALBOTT: I'm sorry, go ahead.

Under AT&T's proposal, there MR. EDWARDS: is no threshold of traffic in that instance that 21 AT&T is willing to commit to in order to locate a second switch or a second POI within the LATA; is

1 that correct?

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MR. TALBOTT: That's correct because there 3 is no provision under the law under which the 4 threshold of traffic under which the CLEC becomes 5 obligated to bear Verizon's originating or Simply, the law says that each 6 transport costs. 7 | party receiving the caller's revenue pays to 8 originate transport and terminate that call. There 9 | is no threshold at which that then changes hands.

Okay. I understand that's MR. EDWARDS: certainly your view. So, my question is, if, in 12 fact, there is no threshold which AT&T agrees to 13 locate additional facilities in the LATA, then don't you agree that Verizon's transport 15 | obligations and recip comp obligations could become 16 significant?

MR. TALBOTT: When you look at this cost 18 on a per line basis, it's nothing. I mean, when we 19 did our cost analysis we attached to our testimony 20 shows that the cost per line for interconnection to 21 | Verizon is a tenth of a cent, a seventh of a cent 22 per line per month, the cost to AT&T under the very

1 best scenario under AT&T's own proposal is 41 cents 2∥a line, and under Verizon's proposal we estimated 3 it could be as high as \$7.88, almost \$8 a line.

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So, when we want to talk about costs to a 5 party to interconnect, let's talk about the whole 6 picture, which is if there's going to be 7 || competition in Virginia, we can't compete at \$8 a 8 line in interconnection costs when Verizon is 9 proposing for its something less than a cent, tenth 10 of a cent.

MR. EDWARDS: We are talking about the 12 guantification in a minute, but right now let's just talk about the fact that there are additional costs. We may quibble about the amount, but you 15 have to agree with me, don't you, that there are 16 additional costs that Verizon incurs.

MR. TALBOTT: That's the costs of competition, yes. Verizon, in order to interconnect with other LECs in the marketplace 20 | needs to deliver its traffic, so it didn't have 21 costs to interconnect prior to competition. 22∥let's be clear: It's not the CLECs that are

1 causing this interconnection cost to Verizon. It's 2 the law of the land now there is going to be competition in local telephony, and Verizon needs to bear the expense to allow that competition to occur. 5 MR. EDWARDS: It's not your testimony that 6 7 if there is no interconnection with CLECs that those costs nevertheless accrue, is it? 9 I could restate it simply. If there is no interconnection from a 10 CLEC, Verizon would not incur those costs, is it? 11 No, it would not. 12 MR. TALBOTT: MR. EDWARDS: Let's talk about the 13 transport costs for a minute. Let me ask you to look at your nonmediated rebuttal testimony, which is Exhibit 8. 16 17 MR. TALBOTT: Could I have a page

MR. EDWARDS: Page nine.

reference?

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MR. TALBOTT: Of the rebuttal testimony?

MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir.

MR. TALBOTT: On the nonmediated issues?

MR. EDWARDS: That's correct.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay.

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MR. EDWARDS: Now, while you're looking at that, Dr. Collins, let me ask you a question on this issue. You don't agree with Mr. Talbott with respect to his testimony he just gave regarding the costs, do you?

> DR. COLLINS: Not entirely.

MR. EDWARDS: What is your view of that issue, sir?

DR. COLLINS: Well, he agreed that absent competition, Verizon would have no cost to transport traffic. My position is that they do 14 have cost. If you use the AD 20 rule with 15 20 percent of the total traffic overflowing through 16 the tandem, that cost would have to be distributed across outline of the traffic in order to determine what that cost is on a per line basis, and I don't 19 know what that number is.

In addition, as Mr. Talbott correctly 21 pointed out, the LATA costs that Verizon must cover 22 which do not exist because in the case AT&T is

covering that termination costs, how that all sums 2 out and what the balance is, I do not know, but those costs are at present, and they should be accounted for in order to answer that question totally and properly.

MR. EDWARDS: You don't disagree, however, that there are incremental costs, and those incremental costs from competition are what we are talking about here? They're incremental transport costs, and there are incremental termination costs.

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DR. COLLINS: There are incremental transport and incremental termination costs. ∥However, the very choice of the word incremental means that the -- implies that a mathematical derivative of the class versus time function. And to the extent these incremental costs exist, 17 network grooming in the intermediate and long term 18∥should be able to rearrange network structures in order to minimize those incremental costs if not 20 drive them to answer.

So, I agree there will be short-term cost differentials, but once again, I don't know how

1 they would net out.

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MR. EDWARDS: Let me ask you to look at page nine of your direct testimony, Dr. Collins.

> What's the exhibit number? MS. FARROBA:

MR. EDWARDS: This is Exhibit 1, Cox

There are only two. His direct is one, Exhibit 1. and his rebuttal is two.

> MS. FARROBA: For record purposes.

MR. EDWARDS: That's right. Those are the two easiest ones for me to keep up with.

> I have it. DR. COLLINS:

MR. EDWARDS: Are you there? Line 13.

One of the things you do in your testimony, Dr. Collins, is you try to distinguish the Cox proposal here from the WorldCom and AT&T proposal; is that correct? Not only on this page, but in your testimony. 17

DR. COLLINS: I think that's fair to say, yes.

MR. EDWARDS: On line 13 on page nine 21 there, you acknowledge that there are costs to 22 | Verizon for lengthy interconnection; is that

correct?

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DR. COLLINS: It points out that the rack costs were not significant? It points out that there are costs associated with, quote, lengthy interconnection links, unquote, but not significant in its interconnection with CLECs.

MR. EDWARDS: It's not that the costs are insignificant. It's because your testimony is that the interconnection proposal by Cox makes those costs not significant; correct?

DR. COLLINS: Yes, I think that's fair to 12 say.

MR. EDWARDS: Then your position on I-2, Dr. Collins, it's Cox's position that, in fact, there should be a distance-sensitive component for transport; correct?

DR. COLLINS: That is the end result of Cox's position, but the substance of that issue is different than I think your implication suggests.

That issue addresses the distinction between a service that Verizon offers and has tariffed, which is so-called cap E Entrance, capital L Links with

1 | Facilities, capital F, a service that CLECs offers, which a small E entrance and small F facilities. Cox's service is--has two components. A flat rate and a distance-sensitive rate.

Verizon also has a "pron" prior to that, ∥but Cox does not have in its tariff--and that is a capital E Entrance, capital F Facility -- offering, and that is the substance of the issue in I-2.

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MR. EDWARDS: I will admit that I did not understand that answer, but let me ask you this way: Is it your testimony that transport sometimes should be mileage-sensitive and something shouldn't issue?

DR. COLLINS: If you pose that question outside of issue II, the answer, and you base the answer on your tariff, the answer is yes.

MR. EDWARDS: Mr. Talbott, let me come back to you. I had referenced you, I think, to Exhibit 8, page nine. Are you there?

> MR. TALBOTT: Yes, I am.

MR. EDWARDS: There you have included what 22 you believe are Verizon's proposed transport

1 charges for DS1 and DS3? 2 MR. TALBOTT: I don't believe they were proposed. I think they were based on the UNE tariff I had available to me at the time this 5 l testimony was prepared. MR. EDWARDS: This testimony was prepared, 6 7 I think it's dated September 10th; correct? MR. TALBOTT: Yes. 8 MR. EDWARDS: Did you look at Verizon's 9 proposed costs in this docket? MR. TALBOTT: I didn't have them readily 11 available, so I used the current UNE tariff. 12 13 MR. EDWARDS: May I ask that this be marked as Exhibit 47. (Verizon Exhibit No. 47 was 15 marked for identification.) 16 MR. EDWARDS: What has been marked as 17 18 Verizon Exhibit 47 is a portion of Verizon cost 19 testimony filed on July 31, which it will become part of this record, if it's not already a part of

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But what I did here, Mr. Talbott, is I

it.

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copied the cover page from a cost study, and where I would like to draw your attention to is what's Bates numbered at the bottom Verizon Virginia 002453. 5 Do you have that? Yes, I do. 6 MR. TALBOTT: 7 This was filed in July, and MR. EDWARDS: your rebuttal testimony is filed in September. Would you agree with me here that Verizon's proposal in this docket is for mileage-sensitive transport costs of DS1 and DS3 11 and other levels? 12 MR. TALBOTT: That Verizon is proposing 13 that UNE-dedicated transport have a distance-sensitive component is your question? 15 Yes, sir. MR. EDWARDS: 16 MR. TALBOTT: It would appear that's 17 correct. 18 If that proposal is adopted MR. EDWARDS: 19 20∥or some form of that proposal is adopted, you agree 21∥with me that the table that you have on page nine

of your rebuttal testimony would need to be fixed

or altered?

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MR. TALBOTT: If the Commission did adopt those proposed rates, they would warrant--my rebuttal testimony would have to be revised, but we are working off of current rates.

MR. EDWARDS: I ask that Exhibit 47 be moved into the record.

Why don't I go ahead and ask the same thing for Exhibit 46.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Mr. Keffer.

MR. KEFFER: I would only note there is probably no need to admit 47 into the record. I think this information is already part of the record. But I don't have any strong feelings one way or the other.

MR. EDWARDS: I think it will become part of the record, I guess, at the prehearing conference on cost studies, so that there was no question of whether it was part of the record yet or not.

MR. DYGERT: Apparently, this is not currently part of the record, so I think at the

risk of being duplicative, we will go ahead and admit it. 3 (Verizon Exhibit No. 47 was admitted into evidence.) 4 I take it there is no 5 MR. DYGERT: 6 objection to the map marked as Verizon Exhibit 46? 7 No objection. MR. KEFFER: Okay, both of those are 8 MR. DYGERT: admitted. Thank you. (Verizon Exhibit No. 46 was 10 admitted into evidence.) 11 12 MR. EDWARDS: May I ask you to look at Exhibit 8, page 11, lines 20 to 23, Mr. Talbott. 13 14 MR. DYGERT: What page? 15 MR. EDWARDS: Page 11. 16 MR. TALBOTT: Yes, sir. Under the hypothetical to 17 MR. EDWARDS: the scenarios we have been discussing, and your citation there of the South Carolina PSC decision 20∥with which you disagree, is it fair to say that you 21 do not believe that the additional costs resulting 22 from interconnection should be borne solely by the

competitor?

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MR. TALBOTT: To answer your question, we 3 need to be specific as to what interconnection costs we are talking about. The competitor in this case, AT&T, is fully willing to pay the costs to 6 originate, transport, terminate its own traffic. We are not asking, and Verizon and AT&T have agreed on this matter, AT&T will be responsible for its own traffic.

To the extent we are talking about traffic originating on Verizon's network, that should be Verizon's obligation, and if there are, based on Verizon's point of interconnection that's selected, 14 | has some additional costs, those are Verizon's to 15 bear.

MR. EDWARDS: You say point of 17 | interconnection that's selected. You mean selected by mutual agreement or if no mutual agreement defaults to the AT&T switch?

> MR. TALBOTT: That's correct.

MR. EDWARDS: Let's go back to the JDPL for a minute, Mr. Talbott. Look, if you would,

1 at--would you look at 12 and 13. And what I would 2 like you to do is look at 15 for a minute. don't you look at that for a minute, and I have a question.

> MR. TALBOTT: I read it. Go ahead.

MR. EDWARDS: 15 addresses again the situation of traffic originating on the Verizon network; is that correct?

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MR. TALBOTT: It could be referencing either party's traffic, so if AT&T is saying AT&T selects a POI that is not at the terminating switch, AT&T is in agreement to pay either the common transport or dedicated transport costs of that traffic that Verizon provides to terminate the 15 traffic on our behalf.

And likewise, if Verizon selects a POI that's remote from AT&T's switch, Verizon should |pay the transport to take that traffic from the AT&T POI to the AT&T switch.

MR. EDWARDS: So, in the latter example, then, you agree with me that this language contemplates a distinction between a POI and an IP?

MR. TALBOTT: I'm sorry? I was distracted? Would you repeat the question?

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MR. EDWARDS: In the latter example you gave, which I think is Verizon-originated traffic, if this language in 15 applies, you would agree with me that it contemplates a distinction between the POI and the IP?

MR. TALBOTT: The IP has Verizon proposed in its contract? Because there is no language in AT&T's contract language that we are referencing here.

That's sort of my question MR. EDWARDS: 13 here with respect to this language. understand what's being contemplated here, it would be a physical point of interconnection, a POI, but the point where financial responsibility, the demarcation of financial responsibility is actually not at the physical point of interconnection but at a distant switch; is that correct?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, that's exactly the 21 regime the FCC has in place today where the 22 originating carrier's responsible to bring its 1 traffic on its own network to the POI, and 2 compensates the terminating carrier for its costs 3 to transport and terminate the traffic.

So, for example, AT&T and Verizon mutually 5 agreed that Verizon's POI would be at a 6 co-location, AT&T co-location, it would have at a 7 Verizon end office.

So the Verizon is going to hand its traffic to AT&T at the Verizon end office. 10 has costs now to get that traffic from the co-location back to our switch. Under current rules, AT&T should be compensated by Verizon for 13 that transport.

> Right. MR. EDWARDS:

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Or, if Verizon didn't want MR. TALBOTT: 16 to pay that transport and wanted to put it on its 17 own network, it could do so by putting the POI at the AT&T switch, and then it would reduce its reciprocal compensation payment.

MR. EDWARDS: So, by requiring Verizon to compensate AT&T for that transport, that makes the 22 switch the IP as Verizon has defined it in this

document?

5 would terminate.

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Which switch? 2 MR. TALBOTT:

3 MR. EDWARDS: The AT&T switch, where Verizon's responsibility, financial responsibility, 4

MR. TALBOTT: When you look at the 7 obligations of the originating party, to originator 8 transport and terminate its traffic, in all cases, regardless of who the party is, there is an obligation to get your traffic to the terminating 11 switch, whether it's interconnection costs or recip 12 comp costs, they're inescapable. We all are going 13 to have them. If you're in a telephony marketplace, you got to bear your own costs. 15 You're receiving the revenue, and from the revenues 16 you receive, you pay your network expenses, and 17 your recip comp expenses. It's inescapable. 18 That's the current rules we are operating under. 19 AT&T is proposing on its contract language that 20 | Verizon adhere to these rules, as we have agreed to 21 do.

MR. EDWARDS: Let me ask you to look back

at your nonmediated direct, Mr. Talbott, page 17.

MR. TALBOTT: I'm at that page.

MR. EDWARDS: It's page 37.

TALBOTT: Yes, sir. MR.

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You included what purports MR. EDWARDS: 6 to be a cost analysis of AT&T's proposal for 7 interconnection and Verizon's -- in this instance, I believe, GRIP, for interconnection; is that 9 correct?

> MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

MR. EDWARDS: And I want to confirm with 12 | you that under Verizon's proposal, you assumed that 13 AT&T would be required to lease transport from 14 Verizon at access rates; is that correct?

MR. TALBOTT: This proposal assumes that 16 both parties' transport costs are at access rates.

> This proposal? MR. EDWARDS:

This study. Correct, this MR. TALBOTT: 19∥study presumes that transport costs are at access 20 rates.

MR. EDWARDS: You agree with me that 22 access rates are higher than UNE rates?

MR. TALBOTT: Undoubtedly.

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MR. EDWARDS: You're incorrect about Verizon's proposal. With respect to the costs for transport, you agree with me that your study here would need to be revised?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, and we have done so, and it's available to the Verizon and/or to the I had an identical study using unbundled 8 staff. network element rates which show substantial 10 decrease in those costs, although the allocation of the costs to each party are still pretty 12 unbalanced.

Do you have something to add, John?

MR. SCHELL: Just a point of clarification. You said this study, meaning these results on page 37 would need to be redone, and they are correct for Verizon's current special access rates.

Now, if you're going to use a UNE-based 20 study, yes, it would have to be done.

MR. EDWARDS: I don't quibble with the 22 math done correctly with the access rates, but the

point is it may not be what it purports to be if UNE rates are used and not access; correct?

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MR. TALBOTT: The reason I used--

MR. EDWARDS: Am I correct about that?

MR. SCHELL: Yes, that part is correct.

The reason we use access MR. TALBOTT: rates is under a different issue, which I wish I had it under my fingertips; Verizon is proposing that if we are going to transport to Verizon an interconnection, we need access rates, and AT&T proposed it be at UNE rates.

But, in fact, the table we MR. EDWARDS: were looking at before where you used flat rate transport rates, you were using UNE rates in that ∥table, weren't you?

I was making a different MR. TALBOTT: 17 point. The point I was making there is that essentially that distance -- Verizon's costs should be distance incentive, which is a different matter than what are the costs to AT&T if it's forced to purchase transport on Verizon's behalf or Verizon's 22 traffic at access rates.

MR. EDWARDS: And the study used in UNE 2 rates that you just referred to, I don't remember 3 seeing that in either of your four pieces of 4 testimony, the revisions or the correction of last 5 night; is that fair?

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I'm recalling in my rebuttal MR. TALBOTT: 7 testimony that we advised Verizon and the Commission that it was available, but it did not 9 include it as an exhibit.

MR. EDWARDS: In fact, in your rebuttal testimony, you did a similar analysis that's in 12 your direct testimony for the VGRIP proposal, and 13 at that time you used access rates; correct?

MR. TALBOTT: I would like to say the 15∥study we did and attached, which was Exhibit 11 to 16 the rebuttal testimony was VGRIP, but I'm 17 uncertain. So, I made certain assumptions about 18∥what it was, but I cannot say it was VGRIP, no. Ιt 19∥was a study based on if the Commission was 20||searching for a compromise on this issue, and would 21 say that Verizon's, quote, IP was at their tandem 22 rather than at their end office, what would be the

1 Costs to AT&T, but I don't believe that's the VGRIP 2 proposal. The VGRIP proposal would still require 3 or allow Verizon to have its IP back to its originating switch under many circumstances.

MR. EDWARDS: My question was, you still 6 used access rates; correct?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

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MR. EDWARDS: Mr. Greco or Mr. Ball, I'm not sure which of you is responsible for various 10 parts of your testimony, but I have a question on your testimony, and whoever is responsible can 12 respond. Let me ask you to look at Exhibit 3, which is--

MR. DYGERT: Could we take a brief break. Is that all right?

MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir.

(Brief recess.)

MR. KEFFER: During the break, I was 19 reminded of an oversight. I intended to distribute 20 prior to this panel's cross-examination an errata 21 sheet for the testimony of Mr. Talbott and 22 Mr. Schell. This was distributed to the parties

1 yesterday. I would like to mark it for identification as AT&T Exhibit Number 30, and then move that it be received into evidence. apologize for not doing that earlier this morning.

MR. EDWARDS: No objection.

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Great. We will admit it into MR. DYGERT: evidence.

> (AT&T Exhibit No. 30 was admitted into evidence.)

And before we get going, MS. KELLEY: WorldCom also has a housekeeping matter. 12 realized on the Joint Decision Point List the 13 WorldCom proposed language for issue I-1, which we 14 been discussing was inadvertently omitted. We will correct the JDPL to reflect that, but I did provide the Commission and Verizon and our witnesses with that testimony, and I would like to mark that as WorldCom Exhibit 39, just so we have it in front of 19 us in the record.

In particular, sections 1.1.2, 1.1.3.1, 21 and 1.3.1. And I put the whole section in the 22 document so you have context.

1 (WorldCom Exhibit No. 39 was 2 marked for identification.) MS. KELLEY: And I would like to move for 3 its admission. MR. DYGERT: 5 Any objection to this 6 exhibit? 7 MR. EDWARDS: No objection. Thank you. It's also 8 MR. DYGERT: 9 received. (WorldCom Exhibit No. 39 was 10 admitted into evidence.) 11 MR. EDWARDS: Mr. Greco and Mr. Ball, 12 13 before the break, I had I think referred you to Exhibit 3, which is your nonmediation direct testimony page 13--I don't remember whether I gave 15 16 you page or line number--page 13, line 11. And again, on the same subject we have 1.7 been discussing this morning, I understand 19 WorldCom's position to be that it's not cost 20||justifiable in certain instances where the CLEC has 21 only minimal business to build a transport network; 22 is that WorldCom's position?

MR. BALL: Yes, I would just clarify that 1 that the question--that that answer should WorldCom or any other CLEC be required to build all of all of the interconnection facilities.

So I would keep the answer in the context 6 of the question.

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. Then let me ask you to look at what Ms. Kelley just handed out as Exhibit 39, and also in the context of 10 Mr. Talbott's answer later on today, is it WorldCom's position that should it so choose, it 11 may have -- it may choose to have only one POI per 13 | LATA?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

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MR. EDWARDS: And if I understand 1.1.3.1, where that POI is located is solely within MCI's discretion?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. EDWARDS: Now, are we talking here about MCI-WorldCom POI or the Verizon POI? Or is that a distinction that you make?

> MR. BALL: Well, in terms of our proposal

1 for the mid-span fiber meet, there is a 2 single--that mid-span fiber meet is the point of 3 interconnection, and it's for both parties to 4∥exchange traffic, so I don't know if the--if 5 distinguishing the Verizon POI from the WorldCom 6 POI is relevant.

MR. EDWARDS: I don't understand this language to be limited to mid-span fiber meet; so am I incorrect?

MR. BALL: Yeah, you're right.

MR. EDWARDS: It's not limited?

Right. MR. BALL:

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MR. EDWARDS: And so when there is a not a 14∥mid-span fiber meet, does this language at all 15 address the Verizon POI?

Well, I think the Verizon POI MR. BALL: 17 would be determined by MCI.

MR. EDWARDS: Am I correct that what 19 you're talking about here is traffic originated on 20 either network?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. EDWARDS: Now, taking this language

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1 back to your testimony on page 13, I asked 2 Mr. Talbott earlier with respect to AT&T whether 3 | there was a threshold level of traffic at which AT&T would commit to build additional facilities or 5 POI in addition to a single POI within a LATA. 6 | he said no. Is that also MCI/WorldCom's position?

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MR. GRIECO: I don't think there is any traffic threshold that would distinguish when we would establish a new POI. In the case what you 10 were getting at earlier if we had a single co-location in a Verizon tandem wire center that was established as the POI where both parties 13 mutually exchanged traffic, there could become some 14 point where that cage would become exhausted and we couldn't put any more equipment in there. At that 16∥point you jointly plan for a new POI location 17 within the LATA.

MR. EDWARDS: So, you would only do it when there is a facility exhaustion?

MR. GRIECO: That would be a driver that would force us to make plans to establish a second 22 POI in the LATA.

MR. EDWARDS: Any other criteria applicable to determining when a second POI might be other than facility exhaustion?

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MR. GRIECO: There could be various other I don't have anything off the top of my reasons. 6 head right now. But we have multiple POIs in many 7 LATAs for various reasons.

MR. EDWARDS: So, in your testimony here, would it have been more accurate to not use the 10 term minimal business, but to provide this 11∥testimony in the context of facility exhaustion?

Well, I think I'd go back to MR. BALL: the question which was -- that that answer was referring to, was should any CLEC be required to build all of the interconnection facilities related to exchange of traffic. I think they're two separate issues.

If that's true, then, MR. EDWARDS: 19∥Mr. Ball, then, I assume from what you're saying that there is a level of business in a LATA where WorldCom or CLEC should have to build all 22 interconnection facilities?

MR. BALL: No.

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MR. EDWARDS: Then I don't understand how 2 3 I the answer is related to the question. 4∥question is--you keep going back to the guestion, $5 \parallel Mr$. Ball, and it says required to build all 6 interconnection facilities and then you say it's not justifiable to do so, although the answer is in the context of the transport only when there is only minimal business.

The question then is, is there a level of business that you can achieve that would require 12 the CLEC to build all interconnection facilities? The answer to that is no; right?

MR. BALL: Correct.

So, is there a level of MR. EDWARDS: traffic other than traffic level that creates facility exhaustion at which a CLEC should build additional transport in a LATA if it only has a 19 single POI?

MR. GRIECO: Threshold in any regulation -- I mean we --

> MR. BALL: I think our position would be

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1 that that would be driven by individual network 2 efficiency considerations versus any kind of 3 | overarching legal obligation.

MS. PREISS: Could you speak up and talk \parallel into that mike. We can't hear you over here.

MR. BALL: And I think our experience at 7 | Verizon where we've actually established these 8 types of interconnection arrangements over the last 9 five years has shown that to the extent these types 10 of network exhaust-type issues come up, there are 11 additional interconnection points that are 12 established. Our concern is having a very onerous 13 contractual obligation to establish additional 14 interconnection points at Verizon's request.

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. So, WorldCom's 16 position is it doesn't want to have a formula, for 17 | example, that would require additional facilities?

MR. BALL: Well, our position is that 19∥there are no legal obligation that requires 20 WorldCom to establish more than a single point of 21 interconnection.

But as a practical matter, there are

network exhaust issues that come up that do require them.

> MR. EDWARDS: Okay.

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What would those network MS. FARROBA: exhaust issues be?

MR. GRIECO: Well, like the case I pointed out earlier, if the co-location cage where we had the POI with Verizon had no more floor space, and we couldn't put any more equipment in that cage, we would have to get another cage or establish a mid-span meet with Verizon elsewhere in the LATA to continue to grow our network and to exchange traffic with Verizon.

MS. FARROBA: What is AT&T's view on that? Is there either an exhaust situation or some other efficiency point where AT&T would build in an additional point of interconnection?

That threshold is difficult MR. TALBOTT: to specify because there are a substantial number of factors that you take into consideration. wherever you have a concentration of customers, it 22 is often more efficient to move the POI closer to

that concentration of customers.

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I think the point ought to be, though, it $3 \parallel$ should be the CLEC's choice, not Verizon's choice, on how we would most efficient or how we should 5∥serve those customers. The CLEC should be 6 determining what's efficient based on its network design, and shouldn't be limited in the contract or given that discretion to Verizon.

MS. FARROBA: You mentioned that there are a set of factors you would consider. What are those factors?

MR. TALBOTT: What our customer forecast might be for how many lines we think we could sell in that area. Do we have some right-of-way? 15 | co-location space available in that office? Special access rates versus UNE rates. Built-in diversity.

MS. FARROBA: Thank you. And then I would also like to get Cox's view on that issue as well.

DR. COLLINS: Cox does not disagree with the views of WorldCom or AT&T, but we have in issue I-4 developed a proposition that Cox is willing to

live with. Each carrier's network and network

efficiencies are different, so I think we have to

consider this on a case-by-case basis. Now I speak

of Cox's case.

And that is that Cox is willing to establish a threshold which will result in removing traffic from its POI to a series of IPs, depending on the amount of traffic that flows to the end offices where an IP would be located.

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The proposal Cox has made in that regard, I think is very generous. It's one-third of the economically efficient network loading factor that Cox would like to see, and, as we will find out, Cox imposed a 3 DS1 level of level of traffic. We did that so that there would be, hopefully, in our opinion, no opportunity to argue against it. It's such a giveaway from Cox to Verizon that we hope we would get your approval with respect to it, and that is what Cox--that is how Cox has come down on the issue. We want to take a step in Verizon's direction because of the way in which Cox's network will be developed and is developed now. We have

1 more than done that, and that is our position.

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2 MS. FARROBA: Thank you. I'm through for 3 now.

Dr. Collins, just to follow MR. EDWARDS: up on that question, under the agreement with Cox, there ends up being multiple IPs within a LATA; correct?

DR. COLLINS: Yes. Cox--well, first of all, let me answer that question by saying the 10 notion of an IP is something that Cox--is Verizon's notion, and Cox accepted it as a result of negotiating the contract and a lot of give and take.

Having said that, Cox's proposition is to follow Verizon's definition of IP and locate one at every end office wherein that traffic is above the 3 DS1 level. So, there would be multiple IPs in the LATA.

> All right. MR. EDWARDS:

DR. COLLINS: But once again, that is a 21∥scenario that is peculiar to Cox, peculiar to the 22 Cox network development, and we are silent on the